



What kinds of electoral systems can help democracy survive in
countries split by deep cleavages of race, religion, language, or ethnicity?
As is well-known, politicians in such “divided societies” often have
strong incentives to “play the ethnic card” at election time, using
communal appeals to mobilize voters. “Outbidding”—increasingly
extreme rhetoric and demands—can offer rewards greater than those of
moderation. In such circumstances, politics can quickly turn centrifugal,
as the center is pulled apart by extremist forces and “winner-take-all”
rules the day. The failure of democracy is often the result.1
Any strategy for building sustainable democracy in divided societies
must place a premium on avoiding this depressingly familiar pattern
and must instead find ways to promote interethnic accommodation,
multiethnic political parties, and moderate, centrist politics. Because
elections help shape broader norms of political behavior, scholars and
practitioners alike agree that electoral systems can play a powerful role
in promoting both democracy and successful conflict management. For
example, by changing the incentives and payoffs available to political
actors in their search for electoral victory, astutely crafted electoral rules
can make some types of behavior more politically rewarding than others.
Over the past two decades, such “electoral engineering” has become
increasingly attractive for those attempting to build democracy in divided
societies.2
While political scientists agree broadly that electoral systems do much
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to shape the wider political arena, they disagree deeply about which
electoral systems are most appropriate for divided societies.
Two schools of thought predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy has
long argued that some form of proportional representation (PR) is needed
in cases of deep-rooted ethnic divisions. PR is a key element of conso-
ciational approaches, which emphasize the need to develop mechanisms
for elite power-sharing if democracy is to survive ethnic or other con-
flicts. Arend Lijphart, the scholar most associated with the consociational
model, developed this prescription from a detailed examination of the
features of power-sharing democracy in some continental European coun-
tries (the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland), and there is
disagreement over how well these measures can work (if at all) when
applied to ethnic conflict in developing countries.3 Yet there is little
doubt that among scholars consociationalism represents the dominant
model of democracy for divided societies. In terms of electoral systems,
consociationalists argue that party-list PR is the best choice, as it en-
ables all significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to “define
themselves” into ethnically based parties and thereby gain representa-
tion in the parliament in proportion to their numbers in the community
as a whole.4
The “Preferential” Option
In contrast to this orthodoxy, some critics argue that the best way to
mitigate the destructive patterns of divided societies is not to encourage
the formation of ethnic parties, thereby replicating existing ethnic
divisions in the legislature, but rather to utilize electoral systems that
encourage cooperation and accommodation among rival groups, and
therefore work to reduce the salience of ethnicity. One core strategy,
advocated by Donald Horowitz, is to design electoral rules that promote
reciprocal vote-pooling, bargaining, and accommodation across group
lines.5 Presidential elections in Nigeria, for example, require the winning
candidate to gain support from different regions, thus helping to diminish
claims of narrow parochialism or regionalism. Lebanon’s electoral system
attempts to defuse the importance of ethnicity by pre-assigning ethnic
proportions in each constituency, thus requiring parties to present
ethnically mixed slates of candidates for election and making voters base
their choices on issues other than ethnicity.
Yet the most powerful electoral systems for encouraging
accommodation are those that make politicians reciprocally dependent
on votes from groups other than their own. This essay examines the
empirical record of one such electoral innovation as a tool of conflict
management: the use of “preferential” electoral systems that enable voters
to rank-order their choices among different parties or candidates on the
ballot paper. All preferential electoral systems share a common,
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distinguishing feature: They enable electors to indicate how they would
vote if their favored candidate was defeated and they had to choose
among those remaining. Such systems include the “alternative vote” (AV)
and the “single transferable vote” (STV).
AV is a majoritarian system used in single-member electoral districts
that requires the winning candidate to gain not just a plurality but an
absolute majority of votes. If no candidate has an absolute majority of
first preferences, the candidate with the lowest number of first-preference
votes is eliminated and his or her ballots are redistributed to the remaining
candidates according to the lower preferences marked. This process of
sequential elimination and transfer of votes continues until a majority
winner emerges.
STV, by contrast, is a proportional system based around multimember
districts that, depending on the number of members elected in each
district, can allow even small minorities access to representation. Voters
rank candidates in order of preference on the ballot in the same manner
as AV. The count begins by determining the “quota” of votes required
to elect a single candidate.6 Any candidate who has more first preferences
than the quota is immediately elected. If no one has achieved the quota,
the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated,
and his or her second and later preferences are redistributed to the
candidates left in the race. At the same time, the “surplus” votes of elected
candidates (that is, their votes above the quota) are redistributed at a
reduced value according to the lower preferences on the ballots, until
all seats for the constituency are filled.
Because they enable electors to rank candidates in their order of
preference, such systems can encourage politicians in divided societies
to campaign not just for first-preference votes from their own community,
but for “second-choice” votes from other groups as well—thus providing
parties and candidates with an incentive to “pool votes” across ethnic
lines. To attract second-level support, candidates may need to make
crossethnic appeals and demonstrate their capacity to represent groups
other than their own. Alternately, where a moderate or nonethnic
“middle” part of the electorate exists, candidates may need to move to
the center on policy issues to attract these voters.
Either way, negotiations between rival candidates and their supporters
for reciprocal vote transfers can greatly increase the chances that votes
will shift from ethnic parties to nonethnic ones—thus encouraging, even
in deeply divided societies, the formation and strengthening of a core of
“moderate middle” sentiment within the electorate as a whole. Such
negotiations can also stimulate the development of alliances between
parties and aid the development of multiethnic parties or coalitions of
parties. Scholars have increasingly found that aggregative party systems
can help new or transitional democracies achieve stability.
This broad approach to conflict management has been dubbed
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“centripetalism” because “the explicit aim is to engineer a centripetal
spin to the political system—to pull the parties toward moderate,
compromising policies and to discover and reinforce the center of a
deeply divided political spectrum.”7 A centripetal political system or
strategy is designed to focus competition at the moderate center rather
than the extremes by making politicians do more than just shop for votes
in their own community.
Accordingly, I use the term centripetalism as a shorthand for three
related but distinct phenomena: 1) the provision of electoral incentives
for campaigning politicians to reach out to and attract votes from ethnic
groups other than their own, thus encouraging candidates to moderate
their political rhetoric on potentially divisive issues and forcing them to
broaden their policy positions; 2) the presence of an arena of bargaining,
in which political actors from different groups have an incentive to come
together and cut deals on reciprocal electoral support, and hence perhaps
on other more substantial issues as well; and 3) the development of
centrist, aggregative, and multiethnic political parties or coalitions of
parties that are capable of making crossethnic appeals and presenting a
complex and diverse range of policy options to the electorate.
Five Cases
A recurring criticism of centripetalism is that there are insufficient
real-world examples to support the case for using preferential voting as
an agent of conflict management in ethnically divided societies.8 Recent
years, however, have seen some remarkable experiments in the use of
centripetal electoral rules to encourage interethnic accommodation in
divided societies as diverse as Northern Ireland, Estonia, Fiji, and Papua
New Guinea. Elsewhere, new democracies like Indonesia and Bosnia
are actively considering such systems, and even such established
democracies as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
are showing increasing interest in the utility of preferential voting as a
means of aggregating like-minded interests and combating “vote-
splitting” and extremist forces.9 A common theme is the desire to
“engineer” political behavior by changing the incentives to which
campaigning politicians must respond. The following pages briefly
survey the combined evidence on this issue to date.
Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland is probably the best-known recent
example of centripetal institutions encouraging intercommunal
accommodation in a divided society, via the use of a preferential electoral
system at the crucial 1998 elections held under the “Good Friday” peace
process. After 30 years of sectarian violence between Northern Ireland’s
Catholic (“nationalist”) and Protestant (“unionist”) communities, the
Good Friday peace agreement of April 1998 provided for a range of new
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institutions aimed at managing the conflict—among them power-sharing
elections, held under STV rules, to a new Northern Ireland Assembly.
Although previous elections under similar rules had been held in 1973
and 1982 without achieving the desired effect, the 1998 election resulted,
for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, in the formation of a
“pro-peace” government in which nationalists and unionists share power.
The use of preference voting assisted the peace process in a number
of ways. First, it provided direct incentives for the major parties to
moderate their positions in the hope of attracting lower-order preference
votes from moderate voters. The possibility of picking up lower-order
transfers was instrumental, for example, in moving Sinn Fein away from
violence and toward less extreme policy positions. This movement was
rewarded by moderation-inclined voters—as the increased flow of lower-
order preferences to Sinn Fein from more centrist nationalist parties such
as the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) at the 1998 poll
indicated. Similarly, on the unionist side, STV encouraged those voting
for anti-agreement unionist parties to transfer their lower-order votes to
other unionist parties and candidates, many of them “pro-agreement.”
These vote transfers benefited the center, allowing pro-agreement
communal parties—such as the Catholic SDLP or the Protestant Ulster
Unionists (UUP) and Progressive Unionists (PUP)—to gain lower-order
votes from other pro-agreement forces. The UUP clearly profited from
the system, as it gained 26 percent of the parliamentary seats with only
21 percent of the first-preference votes. This process also benefited some
of the nonsectarian “middle” parties like the Alliance and the Women’s
Coalition, which received lower-order votes from both sides of the
political divide and consequently were proportionately overrepresented
in the new assembly.
These trends had a beneficial influence both upon the types of political
alliances that could be formed and on the eventual composition of the
new Assembly, more than 70 percent of which was made up of “pro-
agreement” parties. In fact, vote transfers were essential in converting a
bare “anti-agreement” unionist voter majority into a “pro-agreement”
unionist parliamentary majority. Of course, as Northern Ireland’s rocky
history underlines, this may not be enough for the peace process to
succeed—but it raises its chances of doing so.
Estonia. Another example of the use of STV in a divided society
comes from Estonia, which is split between a majority (60 percent)
Estonian-speaking community and a minority (35 percent) Russian-
speaking one. Estonia used an STV electoral system for its first
post-Soviet national election in 1990. In contrast to Northern Ireland,
however, analysis of this “one-off” redemocratization election suggests
little in the way of crossethnic voting or vote-pooling between the two
communities. Studies found that most Russian electors voted
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predominantly for liberal democratic “Russian” parties, and their second
preferences “went overwhelmingly to reactionary imperialist Russian
candidates rather than liberal but ethnically Estonian ones. Likewise,
voters with Estonian first preferences continued with Estonian names.”10
While there was some evidence of vote transfers crossing ethnic lines,
particularly support for Estonian candidates by non-Estonian voters, it
is not clear whether this was a reaction to electoral incentives.
Yet there is also evidence from Estonia that using STV early in the
transition did help encourage the development of an aggregative,
multiethnic party system—itself a crucial agent of conflict management
in divided societies. Some analyses found that STV’s combination of
proportional outcomes with individual (rather than group-based)
candidacy promoted a broad-based party system in Estonia and restricted
incentives for parties to form purely along ethnic lines.11 Other
comparative studies of electoral-system choice in Eastern Europe have
concluded that optimum strategies of electoral-system design in divided
societies should attempt to represent groups fairly while promoting
candidate-based (rather than group- or party-based) voting—and hence
that STV may be “just the institutional trick” for preventing politicized
ethnic conflicts in new democracies.12
Had STV been maintained on an ongoing basis in Estonia, it is likely
that electoral strategies would have become more sophisticated as
political actors learned about the system and its effects. But this was not
to be: In 1992, the new parliament abandoned STV and adopted a variant
of list PR after several leading parties calculated that such a change would
help them. The political effect of STV upon Estonian politics is thus
difficult to evaluate, given the quickly changing conditions and the way
it was adopted as a political compromise and then discarded for similar
reasons. Rein Taagepera points to two general lessons: First, even a
country with as limited a recent experience with free elections as Estonia
had no problems with the relatively complex STV ballot, and second,
“whichever electoral rules one adopts, keep them for at least two elections
before getting into the revamping game.”13
Australia. One of the most interesting recent examples of the use of
preferential voting to foil political extremism comes from the unlikely
setting of Australia, one of the world’s most stable democracies. Although
not a divided society, Australia has an extremely diverse population,
with almost 40 percent being immigrants or the offspring of immigrants,
many of whom come from non-English-speaking countries in Southern
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Preferential voting systems are used
for all Australian jurisdictions, in the form of single-member AV systems
in the lower house and proportional STV systems in the Senate. Over
the years, preferential voting has tended to push the Australian political
system away from extremes and toward the “moderate middle,” while
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also ensuring the election of governments that, in most cases, enjoy
majority support. It has also enabled parties to develop partnership
arrangements—with the long-running coalition agreement between the
conservative Liberal and National parties being the most prominent, but
not the only, example. In recent years the other major party, the
Australian Labor Party, has also benefited from preference flows from
left-leaning minor parties such as the Greens and the Australian
Democrats.14
In most cases, the effect of such vote transfers has been to aggregate
common interests on either the labor or conservative side of politics,
rather than align those interests against a common enemy. One graphic
exception to this rule, however, occurred in the 1998 federal election,
due to the rising power of Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party.
One Nation represented a distinctively Australian version of the populist
right-wing racist parties that had appeared in many European countries
during the 1990s. First elected to the House of Representatives in 1996,
Hanson campaigned on a platform of ending immigration, removing
benefits and subsidies to Aborigines and other disadvantaged groups,
drastically cutting taxes, raising tariffs, ending all foreign aid, and
removing Australia from international bodies such as the United Nations.
Following a protracted period of national and international media
attention, the major Australian parties decided to join forces to eliminate
what they saw as a dangerous aberration in the political system. One
potent way of doing this was by suggesting to their supporters a specific
distribution of lower-order preferences. At the 1998 election in Hanson’s
Queensland district, both major parties instructed their supporters to
place her last when marking their ballot (in contrast to the more familiar
tactic of suggesting that their major-party opponent be placed last).
The result was an instructive lesson in the application of AV rules to
defeat an extremist candidate who commands significant core support
but ultimately repels more voters than he or she attracts. In a field of
nine candidates, Hanson achieved the highest number of first
preferences—36 percent—but received very few preference transfers.
As the count progressed, almost three-quarters of the Labor candidate’s
preferences went to a Liberal, who won the seat with 53.4 percent of the
overall (preference-distributed) vote, even though he only polled third
on first preferences. This result, which was repeated in a less dramatic
fashion in other districts around the country, saw One Nation largely
eliminated from federal politics (although it did win one seat in the
Senate). By contrast, under a plurality system Hanson would almost
certainly have beaten a divided field of more moderate candidates and
taken a seat in the federal parliament. The Australian example thus
demonstrates a preventive form of conflict management: the capacity
of AV to privilege centrist interests and centripetal political strategies
in a potentially divisive situation.
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Fiji. One of the most comprehensive recent attempts at electoral
engineering using centripetal approaches has taken place in Fiji, a South
Pacific island country of approximately 750,000 people divided almost
equally between indigenous and Indian Fijians. Fiji’s indigenous
population is a mixture of the Melanesian and Polynesian groups found
throughout the Pacific islands, while Fiji’s Indian citizens are mostly
the descendants of indentured laborers who came from southern India
to work on Fiji’s sugar plantations in the nineteenth century under British
colonialism. Fijian society and politics have long been characterized by
the uneasy coexistence of these two communities, with Indo-Fijians
predominating in certain key areas of the economy (particularly the
sugarcane industry) and indigenous Fijians owning 90 percent of the
land but holding limited economic power.
In 1997, ten years after two military coups brought down an elected
government seen as overly close to the Indian community—and in the
face of economic stagnation, increasing Indian immigration, and
mounting international pressure—a new power-sharing constitution was
promulgated that attempted to push Fiji “gradually but decisively” toward
multiethnic politics. It featured an innovative package of electoral and
power-sharing arrangements designed to promote the development of
open and multiethnic political competition, including an AV voting
system. By making politicians from one group reliant on votes from the
other group for their electoral success, AV could, it was argued,
encourage a degree of vote-pooling between rival ethnic parties that
would promote accommodation between (and within) Fiji’s deeply
divided Indian and indigenous Fijian communities.15
Fiji’s 1999 parliamentary election, the first held under the new
constitution, provided a practical test for the new system. Early signs
were encouraging: Political parties from both sides of the ethnic divide
reacted to the changed incentives by making preelection alliances. This
meant that the election was effectively fought between two large
multiethnic coalitions rather than between monoethnic parties as in the
past. Parties representing the interests of Fiji’s three designated ethnic
groups—indigenous Fijians, Indo-Fijians, and “general” electors
(European, Chinese, and other minorities)—formed the core of both of
these coalitions. Since crossethnic preference exchanges underpinned
both coalitions, the new rules also prompted the development of new
bargaining arenas that brought together former adversaries from across
the ethnic divide, encouraging a degree of crosscultural communication
that had been conspicuously absent at previous elections.16
At the election itself, an unexpectedly strong vote for the Fiji Labour
Party, combined with a fragmented indigenous Fijian vote, resulted in a
surprise landslide victory for one of these groupings, the so-called
People’s Coalition. Mahendra Chaudhry, the Labour leader, thus became
Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian prime minister. Labour ran largely on a
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multiethnic, class-based platform and was the only party to gain a good
spread of votes in both rural and urban areas, although it was a poor
performer in contests for the Fijian communal seats.
A number of other parties appeared to suffer at the hands of the system,
however, leading to an imbalanced parliament dominated by Labour
and its allies. Popular discontent on the part of many indigenous Fijians
at the presence of an Indo-Fijian prime minister continued to simmer,
and Chaudhry’s sometimes outspoken advocacy of Indo-Fijian rights
served to deepen mistrust over such key issues as land ownership. In
May 2000, exactly one year after the 1999 election, a group of gunmen
headed by failed part-Fijian businessman George Speight burst into the
parliament building and took the new government hostage, claiming a
need to restore indigenous Fijian paramountcy to the political system.
By the time the hostages were released and Speight and his supporters
arrested, Fiji had returned to military rule.
In August 2001, however, Fiji went back to the polls under the 1997
Constitution. Again, the election campaign was fought out by two broad
coalitions—this time, the “moderates” and the “conservatives.” This
election, held under the same AV electoral system, resulted in a quite
different outcome, with the incumbent government of military-
appointed indigenous Fijian prime minister Laisenia Qarase emerging
victorious.
As this uncertain history shows, preferential voting has had mixed
success in stimulating the core objective of peaceful multiethnic politics
in Fiji. On the positive side, the new opportunities for interelite
bargaining and crossethnic vote pooling were exploited by party elites
from both communities. In combination with the expectations of places
at the power-sharing cabinet table, this served to cool significantly the
rhetoric of the 1999 campaign. But the outcome of the 1999 election
was highly disproportional, with the Fiji Labour Party dominating. At
the 2001 election, however, these imbalances were less in evidence, but
so was crossethnic political behavior. Overall, the introduction of
preferential voting appears to have played a modest but ambiguous role
in breaking the old habits of monoethnic politics in Fiji. Whether it will
serve to promote multiethnic politics in the future remains to be seen.
Papua New Guinea. Another Pacific country, Papua New Guinea,
offers perhaps the most compelling case for the use of preferential voting
as a means of conflict management in ethnically diverse societies. Papua
New Guinea is a country of exceptional ethnic fragmentation, with some
840 languages spoken by several thousand competitive ethnic
“micropolities,” reflecting enormous ethnic, cultural, and regional
divisions. Indeed, more languages are spoken by Papua New Guinea’s
5.1 million people than in all of Africa. Despite its amazingly fragmented
society, Papua New Guinea also has one of the longest records of
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continuous democracy in the developing world, having maintained a
highly competitive and participatory form of democratic governance
since 1964.17
In terms of electoral systems, Papua New Guinea’s first three
elections—in 1964, 1968, and 1972—were conducted under AV rules
inherited from Australia, its colonial administrator until independence
in 1975. These rules were replaced at independence by a plurality
system—a move that had devastating consequences for the nascent
political system.
Politics in Papua New Guinea is strongly influenced by the
fractionalized nature of traditional society, which is composed of several
thousand competing “clans”—extended family units—that form the
primary (and sometimes the only) unit of political loyalty. Electoral
contests are focused on the mobilization of clan and tribal groups, rather
than around issues of public policy or ideology, and thus often have the
effect of underlining the significance of basic clan and ethnic
attachments. Since independence, elections have also encouraged a
“retribalization” of ethnic groups, in which the economic importance of
gaining political office has led to increasingly rigid group boundaries
and burgeoning interethnic armed conflict.18 Elections are thus one of
the primary ways in which traditional enmities are mobilized in
contemporary Papua New Guinea.
This was the case under both AV and plurality elections, and it remains
the case today. The difference in pre-independence elections held under
AV rules was that the electoral system appeared to encourage a degree
of vote-pooling, cooperation, and accommodation among the country’s
many small tribal groups, rather than the violent competition that has
become the norm over the past decade. Vote-pooling in pre-independence
elections took place in three primary ways, all of which were predicated
on the assumption that most voters would invariably give their first
preference to their own clan or “home” candidate. The most common
and successful method was for candidates who had limited “home”
support to campaign widely for second-preference support among rival
groups. For this strategy to succeed, candidates needed to be able to sell
themselves as the “second-best” choice—which meant, in general,
someone who would look after all groups fairly—and to campaign as
much for second preferences as for first ones. A second strategy was for
candidates with significant existing support bases to reach out to selected
allies for secondary support. Traditional tribal contacts and allegiances
could thus be utilized to create majority victors. A third strategy,
increasingly common by independence, was for groups and candidates
to form mutual alliances, sometimes campaigning together and urging
voters to cast reciprocal preferences. Not only were these alliances a
response to the incentives presented by AV for campaigning on a
common platform, they also appear to have encouraged political
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organizing and can thus be seen as the forerunners to the establishment
of political parties.
All of these patterns disappeared in 1975 when preferential voting,
seen as a “colonial” imposition from Australia, was replaced with a
plurality system. With no incentives for cooperation, elections almost
immediately became zero-sum contests between rival tribal groups. Most
seats were contested by scores of clan-backed candidates, resulting in
winners being elected on the basis of increasingly minuscule vote shares.
At the most recent national election in 1997, over half of all seats were
won with less than 20 percent of the vote, and 15 with less than 10
percent. Related factors of electoral violence and “vote splitting”—
friendly candidates with little hope of winning the seat standing in order
to “split” an opposition vote—have also became a problem under the
plurality system. Under AV, the winning candidates in many electorates
were those who cultivated the preferences of voters outside their own
local area. Today, such spreading of the net is almost inconceivable in
many parts of Papua New Guinea, as the very real physical risks of
campaigning in a hostile area tend to overshadow the (marginal)
possibilities of picking up significant numbers of votes there.19
Not surprisingly, this state of affairs has encouraged a strong push
for a return to the pre-independence AV electoral system. In January
2002, following several failed attempts, Papua New Guinea’s parliament
voted decisively to return to a form of “limited” preferential voting for
elections after 2002, with voters required to list at least three preferences.
Along with moves to strengthen executive government, weed out
corruption in politics, and promote the development of political parties,
this move was seen as part of a last-ditch effort to turn around Papua
New Guinea’s vibrant but chronically unstable democracy. The main
benefits of the electoral system reforms, however, are likely to be changes
in electoral behavior and a reduction in conflicts and tribal violence at
the local level.
Evaluating the Evidence
All of these cases provide important empirical evidence for evaluat-
ing claims that preferential electoral systems can, under certain
circumstances, promote cooperation among competing groups in divided
societies. This in itself is an important conclusion, as a recurring criti-
cism of centripetal theories in general, and of the case for preferential
voting in particular, has been a perceived lack of real-world examples.
Apparently similar institutional designs, however, also appear to have
had markedly different impacts in different countries. In Northern Ire-
land, for example, it is clear that vote transfers assisted the process of
moderation in the breakthrough 1998 election. But the evidence from
elections held under similar rules in 1973 or 1982—or, for that matter,
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from Estonia’s 1990 election—is much more ambiguous. Similarly,
Papua New Guinea’s experience with AV in the 1960s and 1970s was
markedly more successful than that of its Pacific neighbor, Fiji, more
recently. Why?
A key facilitating condition appears to be the presence of a core group
of moderates, both among the political leadership and in the electorate
at large. Centripetal strategies for conflict management assume that there
is sufficient moderate sentiment within a community for crossethnic
voting to be possible. In some circumstances, the presence of vote-
pooling institutions may even encourage the development of this type
of moderate core, via repeated interelite interaction within bargaining
arenas. But it cannot invent moderation where none exists. It is likely
that a major factor in the success or failure of centripetalism in Northern
Ireland was the lack of a moderate core in earlier elections and its clear
presence in 1998. This is reflected in part by the fact that, in the 1998
election, far more votes were transferred from sectarian to nonsectarian
“middle” parties than across the ethnic divide per se.20
The argument that preferential election rules induce moderation rests
on the assumption that politicians are rational actors who will do what
needs to be done to gain election. Under different types of preferential
voting rules, however, “what needs to be done” varies considerably,
depending on the electoral formula in place and the social makeup of
the electorate. For example, if candidates are confident of achieving an
absolute majority or winning the required quota of first preferences, they
need only focus on maximizing votes from their own supporters in order
to win the seat. In cases where no candidate has outright majority support,
however, the role of second and later preferences becomes crucial to
gaining an overall majority. Thus some scholars such as Horowitz favor
majoritarian forms of preferential voting like AV over the proportional
variant of STV, since the former’s threshold for immediate victory is
higher. In addition, Horowitz’s case for “vote pooling” is based on the
purported possibility of crossethnic voting—that is, the assumption that
even in deeply divided societies some electors will be prepared to give
some votes, even if only lower-order ones, to members of another ethnic
group. In Northern Ireland, however, while vote transfers played an
important role in promoting accommodation, these ran predominantly
from anti-agreement to pro-agreement parties on the same side of the
sectarian divide, or from sectarian to nonsectarian “middle” parties, rather
than across the communal cleavage between unionists and nationalists.
Second, continuity of experience appears to be a critical variable.
The evidence suggests that successive elections held under the same
rules encourage a gradual process of political learning. Structural
incentives need to be kept constant over several elections before the
effects of any electoral package can be judged—particularly with
preferential systems, where the routines of deal-making and preference-
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swapping by politicians, and the understanding of these devices by
voters, take time to emerge. In the world’s two longest-running cases of
preferential voting—Australia and Ireland—it took many years for the
full strategic potential of vote-transfers to became clear to politicians
and voters alike (in fact, rates of preference-swapping in Australian
elections have increased steadily over recent decades), while Estonia’s
preferential system may have been so short-lived that voters and
politicians never became adjusted to it.
Third, the social context in which elections are held appears all-
important. Countries like Northern Ireland and Estonia feature “bipolar”
splits between two large and relatively cohesive ethnic groups, both of
which were effectively guaranteed representation under STV’s
proportional election rules. But in 1998, Northern Ireland also had a
third group: the middle, nonsectarian parties that were not clearly bound
to either community. By advantaging the representation of this group,
STV promoted outcomes that would not have been likely under AV or
other majority systems, or under party-list PR. In other cases, however,
where there is greater ethnic heterogeneity or a much smaller nonethnic
center, STV may not work so well—indeed, it did not work well in
Northern Ireland’s previous elections. All this suggests that a key element
of any electoral-engineering prescription must be a careful understanding
of the prevailing social and demographic conditions—particularly the
size, number, and dispersion of ethnic groups.
The importance of ethnic demography is highlighted by the cases of
Fiji and Papua New Guinea. In Fiji, most open electoral districts—which
are supposed to encapsulate a “good proportion” of members of both
major communities—are drawn in such a way as to become the exclusive
preserve of one ethnic group or the other. Thus genuine opportunities
for interethnic cooperation at the constituency level are rare, and most
contests provide no opportunity at all for crossethnic campaigns, appeals,
or outcomes. Indeed, only six seats were genuinely competitive between
ethnic groups in the 1999 election, while in the rest clear Indian or Fijian
majorities prevailed.21
Contrast this with the situation in Papua New Guinea, where the
extreme fragmentation of traditional society means that most districts
feature dozens of small tribal ethnopolities. To be elected under a
preferential majority system like AV, candidates had no option but to
amass votes from a range of groups beyond their own. Under such
conditions, candidates had a strong incentive to behave accommodatingly
toward rival groups. Not surprisingly, electoral violence was much rarer
under the AV system than under the more recent plurality rules, which
lacks such incentives.
Such cases remind us that divided societies, like Tolstoy’s unhappy
families, tend to be divided in different ways. Yet it is surprising how
many “one-size-fits-all” conflict-management packages have been
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recommended for divided societies without sufficient understanding of
the structure of the society itself. Differences in ethnic demography need
to be matched by differences in constitutional designs across different
regions. African minorities, for example, have been found to be more
highly concentrated in contiguous geographical areas than minorities in
other regions, making it difficult to create ethnically heterogenous
electorates.22 Contrast this with the highly intermixed patterns of ethnic
settlement found in many parts of Europe (the Baltics), Asia (India,
Singapore, Malaysia), and the Caribbean (Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago), in which members of various ethnic groups tend to have
more day-to-day contact with one another. In such contexts, electoral
districts are likely to be ethnically heterogeneous, and ethnic identities
will often be mitigated by other crosscutting cleavages, so that centripetal
designs which encourage parties to seek the support of various ethnic
groups may very well break down interethnic antagonisms and promote
the development of broad, multiethnic parties. Such prosaic details can
determine the success of centripetal approaches to the management of
ethnic conflict.
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